The Y2K bug was a global media event of the twentieth century, only to fade from view after an anticlimactic change of millennium. This article argues that a reexamination of the text of the Y2K bug illuminates the contemporary cultural construction of value in information and networking technologies. Through the examination of a broad range of media reports and articles, this article illustrates how a hegemonic discourse is creating scales of value that have a profound impact on resource allocation. However, the Y2K bug also illustrates how this discourse is subject to its own gaps in meaning, or internal dissociations, as well as to a variety of creative external attacks, including culture jamming.
Harboring the Bug: The Contemporary Construction of the Value of Computer-Networked Communication
The Y2K bug could indeed be labeled one of the great "global media events" of the twentieth century as it became constructed as a subject for worldwide concern. Y2K was confirmed as a "once-in-a-millennium story," and "marathon broadcasts" were planned and expected (Aucoin and Jurkowitz 1999) . The U.S. task force's Y2K leader, John Koskinen, promised that his organization would keep up with "what is happening with everything, all over the world. . . . There has never been anything like this in history" (Koskinen, as quoted in Faber 1999) . The Y2K bug thus became the subject of intense media hype for the years and months leading up to the change of millennium, only to fizzle away as a story in its aftermath.
This article argues that the Y2K bug needs to be revisited, as it constitutes an important element in understanding the cultural construction of the value 1 of new communication technologies in contemporary globalizing society. The Y2K bug became a potent element of the cultural imagination not due to a misreading of technology and its material capabilities but due to a cultural construction of computer technology as a particular form of securing value. The Y2K bug narrative was an essential element in the ongoing discursive interpretation of information technology in terms of a particular framework.
The new communication technologies, particularly computernetworked communication, are increasingly imagined as means of establishing a global-girding, self-organizing web of technology, communication, trade, and finance that will enable the spread of democracy, freedom, and equality. The discursive facility for this imagination is a discourse I have called global digital networking.
2 This discourse has arisen historically from the conjunction of three elements:
1. The conditions of production and consumption, which have become diversified and scattered globally, increasingly involve the circulation of media, information, and symbolic products and services and are coordinated through the ever-expanding capacities of computer networking. 2. The rise of politics without adversaries, as Mouffe (2000) has called it, linked to neoliberalism and the "Third Way." A politics that attempts to present a utopian and humanist merging of public interests into the private; to offer an inclusive position that represents both developed and developing nations, both workers and capital, both Left and Right sides of the political spectrum; and that attempts to self-organize a justifiable, natural, and inevitable form of global, digital, democratic organizing through the facility and meaning of the network. 3. The resurgence of a discourse of the "electrical sublime," which has historically arisen alongside the emergence of new communication technologies such as the telegraph (Carey 1989) . The electrical sublime sees communication as the engine that would link all people everywhere, ordering the world through harmony and commonality. Communications technologies, in this sense, are seen to be able to "fuse the opposite poles of the electrical sublime: the desire for peace, harmony, and self-sufficiency with the wish for power, profit and productivity" (Carey 1989, 207) .
Networking and information technology thus act as the ultimate and ideal conduit for this economic, democratic, global utopia, where the adversary has been overcome, and profit and productivity coexist alongside global harmony.
The Y2K bug illustrates the operation of this discourse. The bug has been traced back to a deficiency of computer programming in the 1950s and 1960s, programming that at the time was positioned as the "progression" of the technological limitations of the past. Forty years later, however, it has become common sense to believe that this earlier programming was itself deficient, and that technological progress in the form of new advances would overcome these limits, most particularly as they so seriously threatened the future of global networking. As a discourse, global digital networking integrates the failings of the Y2K bug into its imagination of a private, digital, informated network through the ideology of progress, which impels a constant forward momentum. The Y2K bug was thus constructed as an issue worth constant and ongoing media coverage through its constitution in imagination and interpretation in discourse. The global digital networking discourse, which imagined the shape and impact of the Y2K bug as a global economic problem, was implicated in constructing its meaning as a principal and defining issue at the turn of the millennium.
In particular, the narrative of the Y2K bug confirmed the value associated with new and networked computer technologies to the emerging global society. First, the Y2K bug was constituted as a worldwide problem, but of a world that is concerned primarily with the economic and private exchange value inherent in corporations. Second, because the bug was constructed as a global problem, value was ascribed to different segments of the globe-nations-based on their use of and abilities to harness and direct technology to either defeat the bug or to have the infrastructure in place to make them targets for the bug in the first place. Third, the text of the Y2K bug demonstrated the ongoing construction of value within a newly burgeoning Information Age and its economic components, "knowledge companies."
Nevertheless, the internal deficiency in the ordering of computer technology, and hence in the cumulative and successive layering of progress, is laid bare by Y2K. Crucially, global digital networking is failed by the insufficiency of the past due to the endless deferral of the promise of complete technological capability. Further, global digital networking is curtailed by the ineffable nature of digital information, which implodes upon not only the internal consistency of the discourse but also its ability to conceive clearly and precisely of its forward path in progress. That is, a new form of technology will create problems even as it solves others, and its results and solutions can never be understood as simple improvement. The centralization of information and networking as an increasingly important component of production and consumption is problematic as well, in that it leads to amplified ephemerality, intangibility, and fluidity, which undermine any rational locating of value. The construction of technological value by global digital networking is unraveled, therefore, by the internal "dissociating signifiers" operating within the discourse. Following Lewis (2000) , battles for power are fought as language wars in which language, and the construction of competing discourses, is the ultimate resource and reward within contemporary culture. The nature of language wars is such that the greater the concentration of power and meaning formed, the more such a hegemonic nodality will be subject to processes of disintegration and contradiction: dissociation. As certain discourses and ideologies in the language wars are centralized, they also inevitably become ossified and unwieldy, increasingly distanced from everyday practices of meaning making. The more powerful a discourse or ideology, then, the more subject it will be to cracks and gaps, to fissures of contestation, nonmeaning and invasion.
Although dissociation is inevitable as global digital networking becomes increasingly hegemonic in its interpretation of the new technologies, its political intent cannot be assured. For this reason, it is equally important to examine the way in which this discourse about the bug was actively challenged and undermined by projects to reinterpret its meaning. As value is an inherently political concept, its construction in text can be seen to be dismantled by external attacks, including forms of culture jamming on the web. Revisiting Y2K thus enables us to both analyze this hegemonic construction of value in relation to new communication and networking technologies and find pathways toward unhinging its hegemony through internal dissociation and external challenge.
A Global Bug: Y2K as Microcosm of Networking Insecurities
The Y2K bug was primarily narrativized as a worldwide problem, one that would affect every part of the globe. But it was a world built around a particular form of value: exchange provided by private companies and their internetworking. Hence, the man dubbed "Mr. Millennium Bug," Peter de Jager, a worldwide Y2K consultant to business and government organization, argued with reference to the Y2K bug that "every single computer in every company, in every country, all around the world, is affected" (Morton 1997) . Bruce McConnell, head of the World Bank-funded Y2K Cooperation Team said, "We have never gone through a global event like this in which all the world is affected by one thing at the same time, something that has the potential to disrupt commerce" (as quoted in Reuters 1999). Comments such as this abound in the discussion of the Y2K problem. The bug was imagined as being talked about and mulled over on a global basis, as being of interest worldwide, and as being a problem that essentially highlighted the interconnected condition of diverse cultures and nations across the globe. However, this interconnection, facilitated through and represented by global networking, was imagined principally in terms of its effects on companies and commerce. The Y2K bug thus represents the potential breakdown of global networking, which is conceived primarily as economic and private. 4 The centralization of the bug in the contemporary cultural imagination, and the incredible interest and hype that was generated around it, was due in large proportion to its reflection of the problems of networking and organization, particularly private organization, on a global scale. The Year 2000 problem served as a microcosm for the situation at large in the global culture-the escalating computer-driven communication and networking of a series of increasingly complex relations. Although global information networking is broadly heralded by the business community as a boon to economic progress, there exists a variety of problems concerned with the independence that arises from networking arrangements. The Y2K bug itself illustrated the way in which the primacy of the individual within a global order is under threat from the contamination of others, the inability to seal one's borders. However, by mobilizing global support for an awareness and "decontamination" of the problem, the microcosm of the Y2K bug could actually work to take control over the ineffability of global flows and connections. The discursive strategy was to contain the threat to the private individual through the proper management and ordering of networked flows in a way conducive primarily to economic globalization and the maximization of profit. By centralizing the importance of worldwide effort, centered around corporations, private elements were constructed as the drivers of value in the new globalized society. The Y2K bug acted as a means of confirming this value, as well as a conduit for channeling anxieties about the broader implications of commercial organization and a globalized networked order.
Entomology: Classifying the Technological Immorality of Weak Links in the Network
The problem of interdependence is linked to another significant means by which value is constructed in the text of the Y2K bug, one which inscribes layers or levels of value to different nodal elements of the global scape based on their interaction with information technology. Value is ascribed to networked nations and regions across the globe in two ways: (1) the value in being prepared for Y2K by having appropriate technological support and (2) the value of having advanced technology systems and infrastructure that are at risk of being disabled by Y2K. These two constructions of value are, in fact, contradictory, as I will argue; nevertheless, they coexist within the discursive logic of global digital networking, due to the ability of discourses to bind together contradictory elements.
The value in being prepared to face Y2K was inscribed in much of the media commentary on the bug through the reiteration of the "risk status" of various countries, regions, and organizational nodes. These pronouncements equate the exchange value of being prepared with a type of moral value, where lack of preparedness justifies the identification of certain regions as points of concern, and a focus for observation. As Fosket and Fishman (1999) argue, the Y2K text thus demonstrates a transferral of uncertainty of the new boundary less order of a globally networked world to the old, secure, modernist definitions of otherness: "By discursively constructing which organizations, which industries and which nations are most 'at-risk' for Y2K failures, U.S. media reproduce an 'othering' discourse that reifies familiar and problematic divisions between the 'west' and the 'other.'" Thus, the cultural landscape articulated by global digital networking can be considered in terms of Manuel Castells's (1999) understanding of the network society, in which the geography of flows is profoundly uneven, and certain valuable people and territories are switched on, whereas devalued ones are switched off.
The construction of a global hierarchy of value based on the objectification and moral judgment of the "other" is evident in the monitoring and observation of nation-states by the institutional embodiments of Y2K coordination, as well as by technology consultants and media outlets. The Y2K task force of the U.S. federal government, for instance, set up telecommunication links to 80 countries to observe and report on "what is happening with everything, all over the world" (Koskinen, as quoted in Faber 1999). The International Y2K Cooperation Centre likewise was engaged in monitoring the situation. As one article reported, "Bruce McConnell, director of the World Bank-funded International Y2K Cooperation Centre, said he has had trouble getting detailed information from some countries" (Jesdanun 1999) . Concerns with the linked nature of global interactions congealed around the potential domino effect if Y2K problems surfaced in other parts of the world-less-prepared, less-developed areas, and significantly those that supply the United States and other developed nations with a cheap supply of labor and outsourcing-and created disturbances on those developed (and prepared) nations. The general school of thought was that Y2K disturbances will be minimal in U.S., but widespread overseas, occurring primarily in less developed areas such as Asia, Eastern Europe and Russia. Disruptions . . . could cripple distribution channels and prevent U.S. companies from selling their goods in those regions. The resulting loss of sales will cut into the profits of many America companies, slicing the value of their stocks. (Prial 1999) .
In a typical example of the discursive ordering of world players in the Y2K text, Mr. Millennium Bug, Peter de Jager, stated, I'm not worried by New Zealand or Australia, I'm a bit more worried by Japan, but I am more concerned about the rest of the Far East. The worst prepared come first. I wish that for one evening the earth would rotate the other way (as quoted in Winton 1999).
Those nodal points characterized as higher risk were subjected to a moralizing discourse that condemned them as "unprepared," as "lagging behind" (In depth 2000), and as "procrastinators" (Koskinen, as quoted in . Even after the turn of the millennium, when computer problems seemed few and far between, the discourse maintained the "possibility of recession if computer glitches in foreign countries held up imports of raw materials or other goods. Nobody really knows where the weak links are" (Sandberg 2000). Small businesses too were the target of anxiety and moral cautioning, as some said those who "didn't do the business effectively" will be paying the price (Associated Press 2000). "Weak links" are therefore discursively ordered as those that fail to live up to their technological destiny. Conversely, there is an equally pervasive explanation that ranked more developed countries as those more likely to experience "meltdowns" (Dadson 1999) . After the Y2K deadline passed, this was a particularly important strategy to explain the lack of catastrophic events-particularly in the highest risk zones. Commentators and technology consultants, for instance, were at pains to explain that difficulties caused by Y2K were a "function of how much the computer downtime matters." Therefore, the discourse shifted in 2000 to explain that the reliance of certain national nodes on computer-networked, communication-based infrastructures had been "misestimated" ( . The Gartner Group reevaluated its claim of "significant disruptions" occurring in places such as Russia, for instance, by explaining that Russians were "300 times less reliant than the U.S." on computers, and thus if they spent $400 million, they had actually spent proportionally more than America's $100 billion (Feder 2000) . Thus, in the hierarchy of systemic imperative, the technological infrastructure in developed countries has much greater importance than it has for the "other" (Ledwith 2000) .
The Y2K text suggested, then, that it was the lack of reliance of developing countries on technology, and their alternative priorities of resource allocation, that provided an escape from their risky destiny. However, the symbolic status of these nations was not consequently enhanced in the Y2K textual hierarchy. Instead, their positioning was reabsorbed, through the discourse of global digital networking, into a new hierarchy in which the technologically proficient crown the apex. Those countries and organizations that did invest in Y2K preparedness are morally justified for their efforts and will reap the teleological fruits of technological progress. The technical secretary of the National Commission for Y2K Information Conversion in Mexico-one of the many less-developed countries to have allocated valuable resources to fixing a problem that probably would not have had much impact justified this expenditure by stating "We've come out on top . . . the quality of equipment and infrastructure has improved, and more companies are now using computers as a result of this experience" (Faiola 2000) .
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The assumption, then, is of a particular pathway to the future, to progress, in which upgrading into the computer age is vital, necessary, and inevitable. Therefore, it was only a matter of time until the developing world got its act together and started to invest in the real source of value-computernetworked technology. Bruce McConnell of the International Y2K Conversion Centre maintains this position, saying that he "will confer with World Bank's Information for Development program, to see whether the lessons learned can lead to ways to bring less-developed countries further in to the Information Age" (as quoted in Roylance 2000) . Thus, the "cross-border cooperation that helped get the world and its computers through the date change so smoothly may pay more dividends in the future" (Roylance 2000) . The hierarchical treatment of global elements within the Y2K text thus defines value in a second fashion: as existing in those countries that have prioritized technology and its economic potential.
Bug Spray: The Glory of a Bug-Free Information Age
Global digital networking thus confirms a hierarchical global ordering through the expression of a capitalist discourse of economic exchange value coupled with a modernist discourse of the value of progress. These two markers of value are coupled and directed through the facility of technology and the burgeoning "Information Age." Information technologyas-value becomes narrativized as an imagination of a "wired world." The new global order, that is, requires information technology to become the ultimate commodity, something that the discourse of global digital networking continues to affirm, even in light of the Y2K bug. Certainly, the embarrassing fact of the investment of huge amounts of time and money in essentially trying to conserve the status quo-the avoidance and deterrence of a particular disorganized scenario in the form of the Y2K bug-is one reason for the ongoing rationalization of locating value in networked, informated technology, as I will be discussing in the following section. However, more crucial to the construction of global digital networking discourse, the constant reiteration of the value of networked technology constitutes an affirmation of a technologically progressive future. Value is increasingly difficult to locate in the contemporary context of new networked forms of globalized production and trade, flexible and dispersed modes of work, and the growing importance of essentially ephemeral information. The Y2K bug should serve to underline the problems of a dependence on networked information technology, and highlight its fundamental insecurity. However, the discourse of global digital networking merely reincorporates this glitch back into a heightened acclamation of the value of information technology, by positioning the failing in terms of its capacity to produce a new raft of technological advances in order to meet a growing set of needs for improved computer-networked information technology. Information needs, then, are not only determined but confirmed and reified through the Y2K bug: "the need to update their hardware and software forced companies to examine their systems and determine their real computer needs" (Herhold and Quinlan 2000) . The replacement of machines was also prompted by the bug, which the discourse affirmed and reassured us would create returns in efficiencies of progress-money went "for new machines that likely will make businesses and government agencies more efficient" (Chandrasekaran 2000) , and organizations should experience a "significant increase in productivity" (Koskinen, as quoted in Landers 2000) that "will pay dividends for years to come" (Koskinen, as quoted in Bridis 2000) . The teleology of technological progress was reiterated through much of the discourse; organizations were able to "updat[e] aging IT systems" (Financial Times 2000) and install "fast streamlined networks" (Carrington 2000) and "more flexible systems to cope with fast-paced demands" of contemporary information culture (Y2K: The benefits 2000); they were able to "weed out antiquated systems" through a "census of computer systems" (Chandrasekaran 2000) and were given the "chance for full inventory of information-technology systems" (Koskinen, as quoted in Landers 2000) .
Information and its importance have, indeed, rather than become questionable through the evidence of its instability, even been centralized, crystallized in the contemporary imagination: Y2K's "benefit is in the recognition by business and government that more careful management of information is needed" (Feder and Revkin 2000) . The bug then, it seems, has "raised visibility of information technology departments, fostered teamwork across large enterprises and made things like disaster planning crucial." The Y2K challenge "may reverberate in terms of new management styles and outlooks" and we may "reap benefits of this exercise for many years to come" (Rowley quoted in Financial Times 2000).
Work practices increasingly tailored for an information economy have also then improved themselves as a source of value. Companies, for instance, have been thrown into electronic business, the inspiration of the future: "when they've had to replace systems, they've replaced them with e-business solutions" (Kendall and Grumman 1999) . Organizations are also more likely to have developed "closer working relationships with customers, improved supplier management and procurement processes and the opportunity to take a more strategic look at internal systems and the way they support business in the future" (Financial Times 2000) . The Y2K bug then acted as a shortcut to practices in line with a "new economy" or "Information Age" that appropriately position information technology as the ultimate source of value. New work practices, associated with flexible Best / Revisiting the Y2K Bug 305 specialization, global networking, and digitization-Castells's (1999) "network enterprises"-are expedited due to the Y2K bug. The principles of networked efficiency and the primacy of information and service in the new economy are thus solidified and validated through the Y2K text. The whole world, in fact, may soon benefit as "analysts believe the world economies have come out ahead because they now have upgraded computers, more advanced software, and a better handle on technology" (Kong and Seipel 2000) . The Y2K bug seems to have propelled organizations into the Information Age, confirming the value of the very informated systems that were strained under the bug's attack. The imbrication of technology into contemporary culture, as well as the growing centrality of information and networking, have created anxieties that are dispelled through a circular logic which validates the continued and ever-increasing exchange value of information technology. The inevitable teleology and commodifiability of networked information technology remains central to the discourse of the global digital network, and the fallout from the Y2K bug merely contributes toward the ongoing validation and confirmation of this value.
Internal Infection: Unfixing the Certain Utopia of the Information Economy
Value is discursively constructed by global digital networking through the ordering of meaning about technology, principally as it is commodified through an imagination of the future. Information technology is certainly represented as the location of value and progress. But beyond even this, the discourse recirculates the meanings of information technology through its attempt to complete the ongoing limitations of its past. The technological failure, therefore, of the Y2K bug only propels an even greater investment in the new reality of an Information Age and a future of technological progress. However, the Y2K bug also exposes the fundamental unknowability both of computer technology and of the ultimate value of that technology, its networking capacity, and its generation of information, an unknowability that essentially extends to global networking in general and that the discourse of global digital networking must continually confront. Thus, gaps within the rationalization of the value of a technologically informated society are not entirely contained by the discourse.
Unfathomable Bugs: Opacity in Complexity
Indeed, one of the most glaring aspects of the Y2K bug as text is the level of uncertainty that pervades its every explanation. Peter de Jager, for instance, argues that we "just can't imagine what a global computer crash would be like" (Morton 1997 ). I would suggest that this uncertainty indicates two related points:
1. Computers are generally opaque to their users, and even to their creators, technicians, and experts. The unknown in any computer-related project is always a factor in its analysis. Computer networking compounds this problem exponentially. The unknowability characteristic of the Y2K bug is not aberrant but actually integral to computers and to computer-networked communication. 2. The difficulty in forming a complete picture of computer-networked communication is thus an essential characteristic of the global cultural landscape. This characteristic of networking is symptomatic of a broader movement within postmodernity to complicate the relationships that take place within networked global spaces. The unknowability characteristic of Y2K is not only integral to computer-networked communication, therefore, but constituent of the very fabric of the global networked order.
As Geoff Mulgan of Director Demos, a U.K. social policy think tank, puts it in reference to Y2K, "Computers seem to offer the possibility of autonomy, of control over life, but in practice, people have experienced computers as in many ways out of control" (Morton 1997 ). The uncertainty of computers seems to stretch back to their very origins. George Tickner observed in the early nineteenth century when he encountered what many consider to be the first computer-Babbage's calculating machine from the midnineteenth century-that the technology seemed obscure to comprehension: "The second striking circumstance was the fact that the inventor himself doesn't profess to know all the powers of the machine, that he has sometimes been quite surprised at some of its capabilities" (as quoted in Morton 1997) .
Computers today are no less mysterious. In fact, the user-friendly interface that Apple Macintosh developed, and that Microsoft adapted for PC use with its Windows program, makes computers at once easier to use, increasingly ubiquitous in contemporary Western culture, and even more obscure. The ability to "point and click" has created a scenario in which growing numbers of people are invited to take part in the technology and yet in which you "don't know why it works, don't know how it works. You just push a button and it works" (Code Rush 2000).
Thus, although global digital networking as a discourse attempts to harness the Y2K bug to hierarchies of value-particularly by technology "experts" such as the Gartner Group, the firm that was responsible for ranking countries on the basis of their risk factor-these same experts end up with nothing other to say than "no-one can be absolutely certain what the effect of all of this is going to be" (Graham Philipson, Gartner Group, as quoted in Morton 1997) . The media had to come to the same conclusion: "Even the experts don't really know what's going to happen after the clock strikes midnight at the end of this month" (Bowman 1999) . Another media commentator explains that it is "extraordinarily difficult to anticipate the outcome in advance. It creates this uncomfortable feeling that something's going to happen, we just don't know when or where" (Prial 1999 ). However, this lack of expert knowledge did not stop the media's searching for it. One Y2K magazine was continually sought as an authority in the matter: "All of a sudden the news media started calling us. USA Today was calling us once a week for quotes. We started doing town meetings. CNN shot one of our deals" (publisher Tim Wilson of Y2K News Magazine, as quoted in Mansfield 1999). However, even after two solid years of work on the issue, the consensus at the magazine that was so frequently called on as an authority on computer technology was that they "still don't know what's going to happen" (Wilson, as quoted in Mansfield 1999) .
The obscurity of computer-networked communication must not be read as only applicable in the situation of Y2K either-an unfortunate, atypical, and abnormal event. First of all, Y2K was a problem with the most basic and fundamental aspect of computers: its lines of code. Foreseeing a solution was completely simple: it involved merely retyping these lines anywhere in which the date was given a field of only two digits instead of four. However, knowing where the lines of code would occur, and foreseeing the resulting problems to those computers in which the code was not altered, and their interaction with those that were, was almost completely unknowable. The problem, then, was fundamental to the working of computers and their essential coding.
Second, the uncertainty of computers and their workings is ubiquitous to information technology. In an attempt to justify Y2K spending, Leon Kappelman of University of North Texas ended up exposing this very fact in his claim that waste for information technology (IT) projects is generally twenty-five percent; that is, a full quarter of IT projects "fail to deliver anything" (Kappelman, as quoted in Hoffman and King 2000) . Nancy Leveson, Boeing Professor of Computer Science and Engineering, argues, in fact, that Y2K as a problem is much more transparent and clearer than the great majority of computer-related problems:
It is a great deal more difficult to understand why a plane crash is due to poor design of the pilot computer interaction, or why we have to cancel an air traffic control system after spending $6 billion and still can't get it to work. These things happen all the time, but they don't get the same amount of publicity. (as quoted in Morton 1997) The general hope, before the turn of the millennium, was that the change of year would be a moment of truth, changing "speculation to reality" (Winton 1999) . However, the uncertainty of the problem, the validity of its solution, and the obscurity of the picture of the globe in which it took place only seemed to increase after 2000. Many commentators regretted not having a "test case" or "control group" that could have indicated what would "really" have happened. Significantly, one article stated that there could be no "test case due to risks of interconnectedness of electric grids, telecommunications networks and global trade" (Howe 2000) . Thus, Y2K revealed not only the uncertainty of computers but of a computer-embedded culture. Y2K exposes that there are "now few areas of life which do not have an intimate relationship with computers" (Winton 1999) because "the huge costs show how deeply embedded the computer chip is in most daily routines" (O'Brien 1999); this demonstrates not only dependence on computers but also the complexity of current infrastructure (Herhold and Quinlan 2000) . The mystery of social organization is the only thing that is in fact revealed with the new millennium. Indeed, the emergent postmodern state of the globe is becoming ever more complex and bewildering as information proliferates; networks straddle and tighten around the globe; and patterns of interaction between cultures, organizations, and individuals become increasingly more involved. As Richard Doherty, founder of market research and testing for Envisioneering, explains, "No-one owns the whole solution anymore. It's kind of scary" (as quoted in Herhold and Quinlan 2000) . The Y2K text illustrated this unfathomability as the postmillennial picture was impossible to grasp even if the technical feasibility of the solution was elementary-the technicality was not the problem, but instead the "three-dimensional webbing that [made it] complicated, and the fact that today, most software is integrated . . . occurs in many places" (Negba Weissdolov from Telstra, as quoted in Morton 1997).
Parasites: A Bug Endemic to Networking Technology
The Y2K bug should not be read as an aberration of contemporary networking culture but instead as symptomatic of it. As Kasvio (2000) suggests,
Even if the transition to the new Millennium did not cause any major collapses of the existing computer systems, the whole process of preparatory measures showed clearly how strongly the vital functions of modern societies depend on the orderly functioning of extremely complicated systems which nobody fully understands.
The text of Y2K is illustrative of the fundamental rifts in the internal discursive logic of global digital networking that attempts, in particular, to secure value within comfortable and concrete understandings of economiBest / Revisiting the Y2K Bug 309
cally sound information technology practices, methods, equipment, and networking ability. These rifts emerge through the precarious characteristics of networking, computers, and technological progress that defy narrow and simplified ascriptions of value. Although global digital networking constantly confirms value in private networking connections, the instability of global links and infrastructure, the problem of interdependence, the obscurity of computer technology, and the ongoing failures of technology and of progress mean that global digital networking can only ever partially overcome the tensions and contradictions it seeks to resolve.
Biting the Bug Back: Culture Jamming on the Web
The construction of value offered by global digital networking as existing primarily within privatized, self-organizing, economic forms of information technology is challenged not only internally by constitutive dissociations but also externally as it participates in those language wars that are forming around new communication technologies. These language wars are engaged in challenging and redefining the discursive construction of information, technology, and networking, including the construction of value.
Indeed, the vast allocation of time, energy, finance, and resources to reaffirm the computer-networked order of contemporary global culture was glaringly obvious; this allocation certainly betrays the priorities of the value system constructed by global digital networking. Even granting that Y2K may have "lifted the economy by being a full-employment program for high-tech workers and [have left] the country [and the global culture] more technically advanced than ever," its outlay nonetheless could have been spent on "hiring more workers . . . treating sick patients" or even, according to some, curing cancer and heart disease (Kendall and Grumman 1999) . Comparing the financial cost alone seems to put the priority of information technology in a grossly unbalanced equation with other global issues, with estimates ranging from $200 to $600 billion worldwide. Two hundred billion dollars, one article states, is "four times the amount that all of the rich countries in the world give to the poor countries in development aid every year," going on to ask, "Is the threat so serious that we should divert scarce money from other priorities-AIDS research, the fight against homelessness, the world's poor?" (Gee 2000) . Another commentator expresses the point well:
If only we could earmark those amounts today for the battles against hunger, illiteracy, racism and environmental degradation. However, when it comes to expenditures for new ways to address such clear and obvious social ills, we
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Television & New Media / August 2003 have to wrangle endlessly over whether the money should be spent, how it should be spent and how much should be spent . . . why does our society work itself into a panic over something like computer glitches, while studiously ignoring underfunded public schools and overcrowded homeless shelters? ("The sad lesson" 2000)
By inscribing privately networked information technology with an inflated value, resource allocations based on alternative priorities are forsaken. Discussions of the Y2K bug that contested this construction of value and its assumptions are thus directly implicated in the language wars of new communication technologies. Apart from occasional media articles that contested the dominant discourse of global digital networking, such as the above examples, one of the most formidable rewritings of Y2K took the form of "culture jamming," a type of identity politics whereby bodily and personal challenges take place through an engagement with media technology. Networking communication practices available through the internet seem to offer an expressive and integral conduit to challenge of the elite hierarchies and meaning-making structures of global digital networking. New forms of cultural political engagement such as culture jamming are thus directly involved in the rewriting of value from the point of view of immersion in the technology as a tool of resistance.
I should at this point place culture jamming as a form of political action in context with other genres of resistance, particularly textual. As argued above, the construction of ideals of technological progress is primarily discursive. As such, resistance to mainstream narratives of Y2K necessarily involved challenges of meaning-making, at some level.
5 As Lewis and Best (2002) note, other strategies included those "millennial cultural refugees" who also "found alternative meanings in the Y2K," in a pilgrimage that led them to "prospect" the globe for a site "for the establishment of a postArmageddon community, a virtualized community that could sustain itself against the horrors of a Y2K darkness" (p. 109). Culture jamming similarly renarrativizes Y2K as a form of cultural political action but does so primarily through parody, play, and trickery. Of course, textual renarrativity has long been a form of cultural resistance, and parody specifically as method. For instance, as Bettella writes, "Around the second half of the sixteenth century, we notice the emergence of a critical discourse which, through the practice of parody, urges a re-examination of the representational models of feminine beauty in literature" (1998, 192) . As Hutcheon (1991) has pointed out, parody has acted as a form of both modern and postmodern political resistance. However, in the case of culture jamming, parody might be more usefully conceived as an element in the toolbox of contemporary cultural and visceral resistance, similar to what Hassan (2001) writes in relation to postmodernism:
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All this is to say that a persuasive model of postmodernism requires a constellation of particular styles, features, attitudes, placed in a particular historical context. Any one of these features alone-say parody, self-reflection, or black humor-may find antecedents a hundred or a thousand years ago, in Euripides or Sterne. But together, in their present historical context, these features may cohere into a working model of the phenomenon called postmodernism. As a political genre that engages fundamentally and systematically at the level of meaning, culture jamming attacks global digital networking and the construction of the Y2K bug technological menace at its core.
Bug Camouflage: Culture Jammers Rewrite Y2K
Culture jamming is a form of cultural politics that concentrates its resistance as individual moments of creativity, play, surprise, shock, and parody. As Cox argues, the "spirit of experimentation is at the very core of the culture-jammer aesthetic" (2001, 70) . Engagements in culture jamming take a variety of forms and exist as more or less organized; however, all can be said to be engaged at the level of the body, which, as active participant in processes of language and persuasion, forms its own resistance. As I will argue, culture jamming rewrites the value of information technology through ridicule, mockery, and trickery. Culture jamming uses language as its ultimate weapon, interrogating those cultural groups and practices it opposes through the discourses they maintain and the assumptions these discourses support. Culture jamming resignifies the meanings of these discourses through plays on words, irony, and parody. It thus uses its opposition's own resources to replicate. 6 Beginning as billboard banditry and other practices, culture jamming has migrated to the web, where culture jammers re-create corporate advertising banners and parody and mimic corporate web sites.
The culture jamming group ®™ark, for instance, acts as a forum for various projects aimed at "publiciz[ing] corporate abuses of democratic processes" (RTMark 1999a), projects that use a variety of methods and are aimed at various ends, allowing the individual interests of a diversity of democratic participants to be engaged. ®™ark has established itself as a corporation, pronouncing itself the home of "corporate consulting for the 21st century," and claiming the language and metaphors as well as the legal rights of the corporate world to pursue its aims for "cultural dividends" and "cultural profit"-and thereby contesting the validity and existence of those very rights and privileges, by redefining social and economic value. For instance, it seeks investment from interested culture jammers through a "Mutual Funds" model that replicates the investment security of the financial sector; its status as a corporation also protects individual contributors of time and money from the liability of its subversive activities. The name itself, ®™ark, is an indication of this method of appropriating the power of the corporate sector and resignifying its meanings: the "registered trademark" of the organization allows its culture jamming endeavors against the corporate networked system to flourish due to its use of the system's own signifying practices. This process of resignification is central to the alternative discursive construction of value provided by ®™ark's Y2K project. In direct contrast and contest with the meanings of the Y2K bug generated by the global digital network, ®™ark reimagined the bug and its imagery within networking culture and then offered this new perspective in a persuasive form, through a variety of tactics and projects. Two projects are of particular note, taking the form of Microsoft PowerPoint presentations. The first of these presentations, "Millennium: What might it mean to my business?" purportedly assembled by "Y2K Industries," was aimed at taking the masks of the language of corporate bravado of the Y2K bug, exposing its underlying assumptions as a concoction of neoliberal bravado and millenarian dreaming. Using the register, vocabulary, and visual effects common to corporate presentations, this exposition simulated the effects of the Y2K corporate consultancy that was rife in anticipation of the millennium; but, by exposing the assumptional basis of these interventions, the presentation "dedoxified," as Barthes (1967) would put it, the naturalness of corporate priorities.
The presentation was attributed to Y2K Industries-an organization that was described as having "no organization whatsoever . . . consist [ing] solely and entirely of the forces of capital responding perfectly to the Y2K bug" (RTMark 1999b), and thus acting as a hyperbolic representation of the self-organizing discourse of global digital networking. The Y2K Industries presentation opens by speaking of the need for "proper guidance" to maintain the status quo of power in free-market capitalism and corporations, and is accompanied by music that is a pastiche of foreign languages, signifying globality. The presentation ironically argues that because the millennium engenders fear in people and with this fear the possibility of real change, the task of the corporate world is to build up the hype of the Y2K bug, thereby channeling social power away from potential disruptions of the status quo. To maintain this status quo, Y2K needs to be promoted as a technical, not a social issue: "By casting millennium as a technical issue, a manageable and dramatic one, Y2K Industries has successfully tamed history for the use of the market" (RTMark 1999b). Thus, the presentation suggests cynically, not only are possibilities for real change averted, but the corporate approach to the millennium opens up its possibilities for profiting from this "bug." The final slide reads "It was a bug. Now it's the future." The presentation, then, exposes through parody and irony how the discourse of global digital networking that informs the interpretation of the Y2K bug constructs social value within technology in such a way that the bug and what it represents comes to symbolize the future. Throughout the presentation, however, this parody is conjoined to the respectability of "corporatese," the look and feel of a genuine corporate spiel. The presentation wavers, then, in the minds of its viewers, uncomfortably close to the truth.
The second PowerPoint presentation acted as a direct rebuttal of and solution to this construction by Y2K Industries. ®™ark in this instance represented itself, and advocated a reclaiming of Y2K bugs as social problems engendered by the corporate system, as well as a refashioning of Y2K hype into a movement for real change. As its solution, ®™ark suggested deepening the everyday corporate raiding, disgruntlement, and negative attitudes to corporate power of the average employee or member of contemporary culture, by shaping these into conscious, active, sustained actions with lasting results. A similar outcome was the intent of project VCR2; by reverse shoplifting, culture jammers smuggled into stores videotapes which, masquerading as a product that would check a shopper's VCR for Y2K compliance, actually played a message that showed how "in the name of progress, of the future, of the Year 2000, corporations have permanently crippled public transportation, destroyed ecosystems, evaporated leisure, and are now again attempting to profit at the expense of our health, with genetically engineered food: these are the real 'Y2K bugs'" (RTMark 1999c). Another planned project involved the dispersal of stickers reading "NOT Y2K Compliant," which culture jammers could stick to any and all available objects in and around public spaces. Finally, one proposed project involved the theatrical invention of "Y2K man," who would destroy computer systems to stave off the threat of Y2K; another involved advertisement of the imaginary "Llama delivery service," which would offer a packanimal alternative to Fedex and UPS.
Conclusion: A Possible Metamorphosis?
This article has argued that the discourse of global digital networking constructs systems of value based around the confirmation of the value of information technology and the new context of a globally networked Information Age. The discourse presents itself as offering a utopic and harmonious global ordering through the promise of the private and the virtues of a rapidly virtualizing world. Value is ascribed to nations based on their technological compliance. Investment in technology-no matter how great-is confirmed as integral to future progress and economic global stability. These discursive elements are all present in the interpretation offered of the Y2K bug. However, the more the characteristics of global digital network- ing are explored, the more its own internal inconsistencies and contradictions become visible, as well as its contestations based around language wars in the cultural politics of computer-networked communication.
Thus, value is constantly escaping a definitive formulation. There are two reasons for this. First, value is becoming increasingly abstracted, symbolic, and networked, and hence unknowable, within networking culture. Second, the construction of value is a primary problematic of democratic organizing and is subject to ongoing discursive contestations based on priorities other than those fixed within privatized information technology. Value is continually contested, and is an essential element in the cultural politics of computer-networked communication. The questions of the meanings attached to networking, how computer-networked communication is or can be made valuable, and what sort of value it might be made to have, are fundamental to the cultural meanings that are placed on the technology, cultural meanings that are necessarily bound up in frameworks of power/ knowledge. Although computer-networked communication, in its most common form of the internet, is increasingly being imagined in terms of its value for commerce and commodification, there have always been alternative constructions of value forming around its potential: as research device, community facilitator, exploratory toy, and resistance tool.
Nevertheless, these competing indicators of value are continually being overshadowed by the excessive affirmation of the exchange value of information technology by the discourse of global digital networking. We will find, for instance, that environmental cost is not typically consulted as a measure of value. Aggressive modes of privatization have distinct repercussions, as the following quote exemplifies:
The promise of the Information Age is the unleashing of unprecedented productive capacity by the power of the mind. . . . The dream of the Enlightenment, that reason and science would solve the problems of humankind, is within reach. Yet there is an extraordinary gap between our technological overdevelopment and our social underdevelopment. Our economy, society, and culture are built on interests, values, institutions, and systems of representation that, by and large, limit collective creativity, confiscate the harvest of information technology, and deviate our energy into self-destructive confrontation. (Castells 1997, 359-60) Certainly, we can evidence the destabilization of this hegemonic concentration of meaning-indeed, as the global digital hegemony becomes fuller, it finds its dissociations and meaning gaps increasing. However, combating the growing hegemony of global digital networking requires us not to depend on the inevitable rifts and contradictions within the discourse itself but to actively pursue resistance and rewriting. Only then can we assure the Best / Revisiting the Y2K Bug 315
